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LETTERS
human coronaviruses–229E and 
-OC43 and severe acute respiratory 
syndrome–CoV were able to survive 
in suspension at room temperature for 
several days (8,9). Moreover, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome–CoV was 
completely inactivated after heat treat-
ment at 60°C for 30 min (9).
Human-to-human transmission 
of MERS-CoV is inefficient, and the 
transmission route has not yet been 
revealed. The predominant detection 
of MERS-CoV by quantitative PCR in 
nasal swab samples suggests the virus 
causes upper respiratory tract infec-
tion in dromedary camels (3). Which 
route or combination of routes is re-
sponsible for its zoonotic transmission 
is unclear, and foodborne transmission 
should not be excluded. Residents of 
the Arabian Peninsula commonly 
drink unpasteurized milk. Our results 
show that MERS-CoV, when intro-
duced into milk, can survive for pro-
longed periods. Further study is need-
ed to determine whether MERS-CoV 
is excreted into the milk of infected 
dromedary camels and, if so, whether 
handling or consuming contaminated 
milk is associated with MERS-CoV 
infection. Recently Nipah virus was 
transmitted experimentally by drink-
ing , which resulted in respiratory tract 
rather than intestinal tract infection 
(10). A similar transmission mecha-
nism for MERS-CoV could result in 
contamination of the oral cavity and 
subsequent infection of the lower re-
spiratory tract. Pasteurization of milk 
can prevent foodborne transmission 
(9). We showed that heat treatment de-
creased infectious MERS-CoV below 
the detection limit of our titration as-
say, and this might function as a rela-
tively easy and cost-effective measure 
to prevent transmission.
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To the Editor: Carbapenem 
antimicrobial drugs are the line of 
defense against multidrug-resistant 
gram-negative bacterial infections. 
The global emergence of carbapene-
mase-producing organisms is a pub-
lic health emergency because these 
enzymes confer resistance to nearly 
all β-lactam drugs and are often as-
sociated with multidrug or pandrug 
resistance (1). Alarmingly, reports 
of carbapenemase-producing organ-
isms from environmental and animal 
sources, including food animals, are 
increasing (1). Recently, clinical iso-
lates of Salmonella enterica serotype 
Kentucky that produce VIM-2 and 
OXA-48 were reportedly isolated 
from patients in France with a travel 
history to Africa and the Middle East, 




To the best of our knowledge, 
before this report no foodborne 
carbapenemase-producing organisms 
had been identified in Canada and the 
United States, although the scope of 
antimicrobial drug resistance surveil-
lance programs is limited to major ag-
ricultural products (poultry, beef, and 
pork) (3,4). In our modern, ethnically 
diverse societies, niche-market meat 
products, including imported foods, 
are becoming increasingly common. 
Worldwide dissemination of the Kleb-
siella pneumoniae, VIM, OXA, and 
New Delhi metallo-b-lactamase type 
carbapenemases among humans has 
been facilitated by intercontinental pas-
senger travel, but the role of the global 
food trade in this dissemination has not 
been investigated (5,6). We describe a 
carbapenemase-producing organism 
isolated from a squid purchased from 
the seafood section of a food store.
Among other items, the squid was 
purchased from a Chinese grocery store 
in Saskatoon, Canada, in January 2014 
as part of a drug-resistance surveillance 
pilot study. Although no country-of-
origin labeling was available for in-
spection, the store owner reported that, 
according to the distributor, this squid 
originated in South Korea. An organ-
ism with 95.5% sequence identity to 
Pseudomonas fluorescens was isolated 
on Mueller-Hinton agar with 2 µg/mL 
meropenem and identified by partial se-
quencing of the cpn60 gene (GenBank 
accession no. KJ606641). Although the 
organism was not extensively resistant, 
it was resistant to all β-lactam drugs 
tested including ertapenem (Table). 
PCR amplification and sequencing 
confirmed that this organism contained 
VIM-2 carbapenemase (GenBank ac-
cession no. KJ625238).
The presence of carbapenemase-
producing organisms in the food 
supply is alarming. Although this 
organism may not be a pathogen, its 
contribution to the resistome and the 
potential for lateral gene transfer to 
clinically relevant bacteria is certainly 
a cause for concern. This finding in-
dicates that the risk for exposure to 
carbapenemases extends beyond per-
sons with particular travel histories, 
previous antimicrobial drug use, or 
hospitalization and into the general 
public. There is an urgent need for 
expanded resistance surveillance for 
carbapenemase-producing organisms 
and their resistance plasmids in food 
products that are not captured under 
current programs.
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Table.	Antimicrobial	drug	susceptibility	of	a	VIM-2	producing	Pseudomonas 
fluorescens–like	organism	isolated	from	food	(squid),	Saskatoon,	Canada, 
January	2014 
Antimicrobial	drug MIC 
Ampicilin >32 
Amoxicillin	+	clavulanic	acid >32 
Cefoxitin >32 
Ceftiofur >8 
Ceftriaxone >64 
Azithromycin 16 
Chloramphenicol 16 
Tetracycline ≤4 
Naladixic	acid 16 
Ciprofloxacin 0.06 
Gentamicin ≤0.25 
Kanamycin 16 
Streptomycin ≤32 
Sulfisoxazole 32 
Trimethoprim	+	sulfamethoxazole 0.5 
Ertapenem* >32 
Tigecycline* 0.125 
Colistin* 3 
*MICs	determined	by	Etest;	all	others	were	determined	by	broth	microdilution. 
 
